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This paper analyzes how the existence of upstream market power affects 
endogenous quality choice in a setting where two downstream firms are locked 
in a bilateral monopoly with their own input suppliers. The main result is that 
the degree of product differentiation is reduced as upstream market power 
increases. This holds under Bertrand and Cournot competition, although 
differentiation is higher in the former. If competition takes place in a Cournot 
fashion and downstream firms have no bargaining power at all, they choose no 
differentiation. I also show the effects of an upstream and a downstream merger. 
When input suppliers merge to monopoly, the quality choice is not affected by 
the upstream market power and differentiation always emerges. When the 
downstream segment is shaped by a monopoly, goods become homogeneous 
unless input suppliers have weak bargaining power. If input prices are high 
enough before the downstream merger, a downstream monopoly leads to an 
increase in social welfare. 
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  31 Introduction
Recently, several works have analyzed the strategic behaviour of vertically related industries.
Starting with Horn and Wolinsky (1988), some of them study the e⁄ects of increases in concen-
tration at the downstream segment on input prices and welfare. Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996),
Dobson and Waterson (1997), Chen (2003), Lommerud et al. (2003) and Symeonidis (2008, 2010)
￿nd that countervailing power, through a reduction in input prices, may arise welfare when up-
stream ￿rms have a signi￿cant bargaining power and goods are close substitutes. In these works
the degree of product di⁄erentiation plays a crucial role, however none of them consider its choice
by ￿rms, assuming it as exogenous. In my article I extend some of the previous ￿ndings to a model
of vertical di⁄erentiation with endogenous quality choice. As the degree of product di⁄erentiation
a⁄ects input prices, by allowing downstream ￿rms to choose it, they have a new instrument to
curb the market power of input suppliers. There exist several examples of how the degree of prod-
uct di⁄erentiation a⁄ects input prices. In the food manufacturing industry, the introduction of a
low quality brand by leading multinational retailers has forced manufacturers to reduce the price
of their products. In the automobile industry, assemblers use the same components in di⁄erent
product lines to enhance their bargaining position at expenses of input suppliers. The threat of
shifting production between plants of automobile assemblers has lead to important reductions in
wages by trade unions (Peoples et al (1993)). It is easy to see that such threat will be more
e⁄ective as products become close substitutes.
In this article I consider a successive duopolistic structure within which to study how quality
choice is a⁄ected by changes in the distribution of the bargaining power in the vertical chain. I
also analyze how endogenous quality choice is a⁄ected by a merger between upstream ￿rms and a
merger between downstream ￿rms.
To deal with the ￿rst question, I examine endogenous equilibrium qualities in a setting where two
independent input suppliers are locked in a bilateral monopoly with two separate downstream
1￿rms.1 I assume that downstream ￿rms choose qualities, producing a ￿nal good by transforming
an input supplied by upstream ￿rms. Negotiations between suppliers and downstream ￿rms
take place through a linear wholesale price contract specifying a per-unit of input price w. The
negotiations are modelled as a generalized Nash bargaining problem. I solve the endogenous
equilibrium qualities for Bertrand and Cournot competition, and focus on variable costs of quality
improvement. The main contribution of this article is to show that downstream ￿rms tend to
reduce product di⁄erentiation as the bargaining power of input suppliers increases. Furthermore,
in the Cournot setting, when upstream ￿rms have all the bargaining power, no di⁄erentiation
emerges. The intuition is as follows. When input suppliers act independently, they do not take
into account how the price of their inputs a⁄ects the input demand of their rival. In particular,
they do not internalize that an increase in the price of the input has a positive e⁄ect on rival￿ s
demand. I show how a greater bargaining position of input suppliers leads to an increase in input
prices, but as far as this increase is always higher for the input price of the high quality ￿rm
(its demand is more inelastic), the low quality producer bene￿ts more from this positive e⁄ect,
increasing its market share. A greater (smaller) market share for the low (high) quality ￿rm
increases (decreases) its marginal pro￿ts of quality, being able to choose a higher (lower) quality.
This makes narrower the gap of qualities. From other point of view, in this setting input prices
become a positive externality for rivals, and this externality is greater for the low quality ￿rm. As
input suppliers enhance their bargaining position, the externality on the low quality ￿rm increases
with respect to the high quality one, making bigger the loss of market share of the high quality ￿rm
in favour of its rival, leading to closer quality choice, and no di⁄erentiation when upstream ￿rms
have all the bargaining power and competition is ￿ la Cournot. This seems paradoxical because
upstream ￿rms would be better o⁄ with di⁄erentiation, given that input demands become more
inelastic. Regardless the increase in the intensity of competition that a higher upstream bargaining
1 Bilateral monopoly may emerge from many sources, such as irreversible R&D expenditures, high costs of input
transportation, or cases in which ￿rms use a unionized labour force
2causes, consumer surplus and welfare reduce due to the increase in input prices.
Several works have analyzed the issue of quality competition since the early article by Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979). Some of these articles compare endogenous equilibrium qualities under price
and quantity competition. In these models, the degree of quality di⁄erentiation depends on the
nature of the competition and the assumptions about the costs of quality.2 Motta (1993) considers
a model where only two ￿rms operate in the market. At the ￿rst stage they choose qualities and,
in the second stage, they compete in the ￿nal market. Motta analyzes Bertrand and Cournot
competition by using two di⁄erent settings, where ￿rms have ￿xed or variable costs of quality
improvement. Given that no exogenous upper bound for quality is assumed, his model generalizes
previous results in the literature of this topic. I take his model to examine how quality choice by
downstream ￿rms is a⁄ected by the presence of input suppliers. Thus, I can embed his results
on mine when upstream ￿rms have no bargaining power. Motta (1993) obtains that ￿rms always
di⁄erentiate their products, being the degree of product di⁄erentiation and social welfare higher
under Bertrand competition. These results hold in my model unless competition takes place on
quantities and downstream ￿rms have no bargaining power at all, where no di⁄erentiation emerges.
I also examine the e⁄ects of two types of mergers; mergers between upstream ￿rms and mergers
between downstream ￿rms. As far as I know, the e⁄ects that an upstream and a downstream
merger have on the quality choice has not been analyzed before. If the two input suppliers
merge, they are able to coordinate their actions, internalizing all the e⁄ects that prices cause on
the demands of downstream ￿rms. As a result, input prices reduce output and pro￿ts of the
downstream ￿rms in the same proportion, without a⁄ecting the quality choice. In fact, the choice
is the same than with no upstream ￿rms (Motta (1993)). As downstream ￿rms di⁄erentiate their
products more than in the situation with independent input suppliers, their demands become more
2 There are two canonical cases about costs in the literature of this topic. Fixed costs of quality improvement,
such as investments in R&D [Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Bonanno (1986)], or variable costs associated
to skilled labour [Mussa and Rossen (1978), Gal-Or (1983), Champsaur and Rochet (1989)]. I use variable costs
and refer to these papers for a discussion of its relevance. As the main result of this paper is that the degree of
product di⁄erentiation reduces with upstream market power, and it depends on the non-internalized e⁄ects of input
suppliers, I do not think this main result changes by assuming ￿xed costs of quality improvement.
3inelastic and the monopolist set higher prices. The new entity serves both downstream ￿rms, and
the merger is always pro￿table. A similar result can be found in Horn and Wolinsky (1988),
and Milliou and Petrakis (2007), where input prices are set also by bargaining but in a model of
horizontal di⁄erentiation.
Finally, it is shown that a downstream merger leads to an increase in the responsiveness of the
input demands, forcing input suppliers to set lower prices. It is due to the fact that the downstream
monopolist is able to increase the production of one good to the detriment of the other, threatening
input suppliers by reducing their input demand. As far as the quality choice is endogenous, and
the replacing between goods becomes easier when the degree of product di⁄erentiation is lower,
the downstream monopolist faces a trade-o⁄: either di⁄erentiating the products to increase the
number of consumers, or getting a reduction in input prices by closing the gap between qualities.
We will see how the second factor prevails and goods become homogeneous unless the bargaining
position of input suppliers is su¢ ciently weak. Inderst and Sha⁄er (2007) also obtain that a
downstream merger reduces the degree of product di⁄erentiation by analyzing the impact of retail
mergers on product variety. They ￿nd that a merger may create an incentive for the retailer
to force suppliers to compete to become the exclusive supplier. As a result suppliers reduce
di⁄erentiation to ￿t the characteristics of their products to consumers preferences in two di⁄erent
markets. Product variety is also reduced, decreasing social welfare. In my model, conversely to
Inderst and Sha⁄er (2007), the downstream monopolist always ￿nds pro￿table to buy inputs from
both upstream ￿rms, and social welfare increases whenever input prices are high enough before
the merger, given that the reduction in such input prices will be transmitted to consumers.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the model and solve for the
equilibrium of the downstream industry, under Bertrand and Cournot competition. In section 3, I
solve the model for the case of independent suppliers and for both types of competition. In section
4, the case of an upstream merger is analyzed for Cournot competition. I do the same in section
5 for a downstream merger. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
42 The Model
2.1 Consumers
Consider a unit mass of consumers, whose tastes are described by parameter ￿ 2 [￿;￿], uniformly
distributed with unit density. In accordance with the literature, it is assumed that consumers
either buy one unit of the good, or buy nothing. The utility function is the Mussa and Rosen
(1978) type. If consumers purchase good i, their utility is U = ￿￿i ￿pi, where ￿i and pi represent
the quality and the price of the good i, respectively. Given any price p; a higher ￿ means a higher
utility for consumers, which are willing to pay more for such a quality. If consumers do not buy
the good their utility is zero. It is assumed that they can buy two di⁄erent goods, good H with
quality ￿H, and good L with quality ￿L, where ￿H > ￿L, and prices pH and pL, respectively.
Hence, ￿HL =
pH￿pL
￿H￿￿L is the taste parameter of the indi⁄erent consumer between buying good
H and L, and ￿L? =
pL
￿L between buying L and nothing. If a consumer has a taste parameter
between ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿HL she will buy good H, whereas she will buy good L when ￿HL > ￿ ￿ ￿L?.
Finally, she will not buy at all when ￿ < ￿L?. Given these consumers￿preferences, the demand
functions are:












I consider a two-tier industry consisting of two downstream ￿rms, H and L, producing di⁄erenti-
ated products. Firm H (L) does it by using an input lH (lL), bought at price wH (wL) to supplier
LH (LL). Therefore, downstream and upstream ￿rms are locked in a bilateral monopoly. Firm H
produces the good with high quality ￿H, whereas ￿rm L produces the good with lower quality ￿L.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost of producing these inputs is zero. However, downstream
￿rms incur in a variable cost, increasing in quality, ci = 1
2￿2
i i2fH;Lg, to transform the inputs into
5￿nal goods on a one to one basis, qi = li i2fH;Lg:3
Firms play the following three-stage game.
(i) In the ￿rst stage, downstream ￿rms choose qualities. As in Motta (1993), I do not assume an
upper bound for the level of quality.
(ii) In the second stage, upstream and downstream ￿rms bargain over the price of the input. They
use a linear wholesale price contract where they specify a per-unit of input price w. Negotiations
are described as a simultaneous generalized Nash bargaining problem. Parameter ￿ captures the
bargaining power of the upstream ￿rms, and 1￿￿ represents the bargaining power of downstream
￿rms, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. This implies that each bargaining pair take as given the outcome of the
simultaneously-run negotiations of the other bargaining pair.
(iii) In the third stage, two cases are analyzed. Downstream ￿rms setting quantities in the ￿nal
market, or setting prices. The respective equilibrium concepts are the Cournot and the Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium.
The whole game is solved by backward induction using the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium.
2.3 Cournot competition
The demand functions [1] and [2] are inverted, obtaining:
pH = ￿￿H ￿ qH￿H ￿ qL￿L (3)
pL = ￿￿L ￿ qH￿L ￿ qL￿L (4)
where qH and qL are the quantities demanded of the high and low quality good, respectively. The
pro￿t function for downstream ￿rms are:
￿i = (pi ￿ ci)qi ￿ liwi i2fH;Lg (5)
They choose quantities in order to maximize pro￿ts. I introduce equations [3] and [4] in [5]. Given
that the production function is qi = li, for simplicity I will use q instead of l. Once the ￿rst order
conditions are derived, I obtain the reaction functions:
3 If it is assumed that upstream ￿rms incur in a variable cost of quality improvement instead of downstream
￿rms, the results of this article do not change.
6RH(qL) =




￿￿L ￿ qH￿L ￿ wL ￿ cL
2￿L
(7)
From [6] and [7], the input demands are derived:
lH(wH;wL) = qH(wH;wL) =
2￿￿H ￿ ￿￿L ￿ 2wH + wL ￿ 2cH + cL
4￿H ￿ ￿L
(8)
lL(wH;wL) = qL(wH;wL) =
￿￿H￿L ￿ 2wL￿H + wH￿L ￿ 2cL￿H + cH￿L
(4￿H ￿ ￿L)￿L
(9)

























As far as ￿H > ￿L, the input demand of the low quality ￿rm is more elastic than the input demand
of the high quality one. Ceteris paribus, the former ￿rm will face a lower input price than the
latter one.
Finally, I derive downstream pro￿ts as a function of input prices:
￿H(wH;wL) =
￿H(2￿￿H ￿ ￿￿L ￿ 2wH + wL ￿ 2cH + cL)2
(￿4￿H + ￿L)2 (11)
￿L(wH;wL) =
((￿￿H + wH + cH)￿L ￿ 2(cL + wL)￿H)2
￿L(￿4￿H + ￿L)2 (12)
2.4 Bertrand competition
I examine now the same case as before but assuming Bertrand competition in the ￿nal market.
Demand functions [1] and [2] are introduced in the pro￿ts function of downstream ￿rms (equation
[5]). Once the ￿rst order conditions are obtained, the reaction functions are:
RH(pL) =




pH￿L + wL￿H + cL￿H
2￿H
(14)
and the input demands:










As in the Cournot setting, the input demand of the low quality ￿rm is more elastic than the input





























The following expression summarizes that the response of input demands to their prices is greater,



















￿ ￿ > 0 (18)
To conclude, I derive downstream pro￿ts as a function of input prices:
￿H(wH;wL) =
(￿H(￿2cH + cL ￿ 2wH + wL + 2￿￿H) + (cH + wH ￿ 2￿￿H)￿L)2
(￿4￿H + ￿L)2(￿H ￿ ￿L)
(19)
￿L(w1;w2) =
￿H(2(cL + wL)￿H ￿ (cH + cL + wH + wL + ￿￿H)￿L + ￿￿2
L)2
(￿4￿H + ￿L)2(￿H ￿ ￿L)￿L
(20)
3 Independent Input Suppliers
In the second stage of the game, input supplier LH and downstream ￿rm H bargain over the
wholesale price wH, assuming that the wholesale price wL has been ￿xed in the simultaneous run
negotiations between supplier LL and ￿rm L. Negotiations are modelled as a generalized Nash
bargaining problem, where ￿ captures the bargaining power of upstream ￿rms, and 1 ￿ ￿ the
bargaining power of downstream ￿rms, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The equilibrium is characterized by using
the generalized Nash product solution. The pro￿t functions of input suppliers LH and LL are
described by:
￿i = wi[li(wi;wj)] i;j2fH;Lg i6=j (21)
The input supplier LH bargains with the downstream ￿rm H about the wholesale price wH. The
outcome of the simultaneous run negotiations between upstream ￿rm LL and L is taken as given,





where ￿H(wH;wL) and ￿H(wH;wL) are upstream and downstream pro￿ts, respectively. As ￿rms
have no outside option, their disagreement payo⁄s are zero.
3.1 Cournot competition




















Rearranging, I obtain the best-reply functions in input prices:
RH(wL) =




((￿￿H + wH + cH)￿L ￿ 2cL￿H)￿
4￿H
(26)
where we can observe how input prices depend positively on rivals￿ones, as they are strategic
complements. If an input supplier decides to increase its input price, its demand will fall, leading
to an increase in the rival￿ s input demand, whose price is going to increase.
From [25] and [26] the equilibrium input prices are derived:
wH =




￿(cL(8￿H ￿ ￿￿L) + ￿L(2cH(￿2 + ￿) ￿ 2(2 + ￿)￿￿H + ￿￿￿L))
￿16￿H ￿ ￿2￿L
(28)
4 These calculations have been performed with the software Mathematica. All second order conditions are met,
and it is possible to show that input prices are always positive.
5 The negotiations between input supplier LL and downstream ￿rm L are simultaneous to ￿rms LH and H.
Equations [12] and [21] are now used to maximize the generalized Nash product.
9It can be checked that each input price depends on both qualities. As ￿rms are locked in a bilateral
monopoly, input suppliers cannot coordinate their actions, not internalizing the e⁄ect that their
respective prices have on the rival￿ s demand.
Rearranging equations [23] and [24] input prices can be expressed in the following way:
wi = (pi ￿ ci)￿ i2fH;Lg (29)
where ￿ =
￿(4￿H￿￿L)
2(2+￿)￿H￿￿￿L. Equation [29] summarizes how input suppliers, as they do not internalize
all the e⁄ects that their prices cause, ￿x input prices as a fraction of downstream pro￿ts. Now I
introduce equation [29] in input demands (equations [8] and [9]). To be more precise, I introduce
wH = (pH ￿ cH)￿ in the input demand of the high quality ￿rm, and wL = (pL ￿ cL)￿ in the low
quality one. Thus, input demands can be re-formulated as a function of the price of the input of
the rival:
qH(wL) = (



















where ￿ = 2
2￿￿, with ￿ 2 [1;2]. The greater ￿ the greater the fall in the input demand of both
￿rms. But the key point is that wH a⁄ects qH in the same way than wL a⁄ects qL, precisely 1
￿. If
we look at the input demands when there are no upstream ￿rms (input prices are zero):
qH(wH=0;wL=0) =




￿￿H￿L ￿ 2cL￿H + cH￿L
(4￿H ￿ ￿L)￿L
(33)
and we compare the market share of downstream ￿rms with the presence of upstream ￿rms
(wi > 0),
qH(wL)
qL(wH), and with no upstream ￿rms (wi = 0),
qH(wH=0;wL=0)
qL(wH=0;wL=0), it can be checked that the
di⁄erence only depends on the price of the input of the rival. It is also easy to see in equations [30]
and [31] that the input price of the rivals expands the demands, becoming a positive externality,
but as far as wH > wL, the low quality ￿rm will increase its market share to the detriment of the
high quality one, with respect to the setting in which there are no upstream ￿rms and input prices
are zero [Motta (1993)]. Furthermore, it can be proved that
@(wH￿wL)
@￿ > 0; therefore, the higher
10the bargaining power of upstream ￿rms, the higher the positive externality of the low quality ￿rm
with respect to the high quality one, and the greater the market share of the former.
Finally, it can be stated the following relation:
￿i = q2
i ￿i i2fH;Lg (34)
A greater market share of the low quality ￿rm leads to a greater proportion of pro￿ts with respect
to the high quality rival. In fact, it can also be proved that
@(￿H￿￿L)
@￿ < 0. This allows the former
to increase its quality whereas the latter is forced to decrease its own.
Finally, I analyze how downstream ￿rms choose qualities. It can be checked how parameter ￿




H + 8￿￿L ￿ 2￿￿￿L ￿ ￿￿H￿L ￿ 4￿2
L + 2￿￿2
L)2
(4￿H ￿ ￿L)2(16￿H ￿ ￿2￿L)2 (35)
￿L =
(￿ ￿ 2)2￿2
H￿L(8￿￿H + 4￿￿￿H + 4￿2
H ￿ 2￿￿2
H ￿ 2￿￿￿L ￿ 8￿H￿L + ￿￿2
L)2
(￿4￿H + ￿L)2(￿16￿H + ￿2￿L)2 (36)
Downstream ￿rms H and L choose their respective qualities ￿H and ￿L in order to maximize ￿H
and ￿L. Deriving the ￿rst order conditions, and taking the values ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, the quality
choice is ￿H = 0:738096￿, ￿L = 0:585576￿ and ￿H = ￿L = 2
3￿, respectively6 . Proposition 1
summarizes the previous results:
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, the
degree of product di⁄erentiation that downstream ￿rms choose reduces as the upstream bar-
gaining power increases. No di⁄erentiation only emerges when downstream ￿rms have no
bargaining power at all.
Proof Appendix
A higher ￿ leads to a best position in terms of output for the low quality ￿rm. The margin of
pro￿ts, and the marginal pro￿t of quality reduces for the high quality ￿rm with respect to the
low quality one. Hence, the better position of the low quality ￿rm leads to a closer quality choice.
A similar result can be found in Scarpa (1998), where the introduction of a minimum quality
standard leads to a reduction of the highest quality in the market. Finally, when upstream ￿rms
6 See Table 1 in the Appendix
11have no bargaining power (￿ = 0), the degree of product di⁄erentiation is higher than for any
positive value of ￿. As ￿ increases, the bargaining power of upstream ￿rms also increases, and
they are going to incentive downstream competition through the uneven positive e⁄ect that input
prices cause on rivals, leading to a lower degree of product di⁄erentiation. When ￿ = 1, and
upstream ￿rms have all the bargaining power, downstream ￿rms choose the same quality and the
level of competition is maximum.
3.2 Bertrand competition
In this setting downstream ￿rms compete in prices. To determine the optimal input price, wH,
I introduce equations [19] and [21] in [22]:7The ￿rst-order conditions are the same than in the
Cournot setting (equations [23] and [24]). From them, I obtain the best-reply functions in input
prices:
RH(wL) =
￿2cH￿￿H + cL￿￿H + wL￿￿H + 2￿￿￿2






























Under Bertrand competition, input prices also depend on both qualities. Equation [29] holds,
but now ￿ =
￿(4￿H￿￿L)
2(2+￿)￿H￿2￿L. It is easy to check that the value of this parameter is greater under
Bertrand competition. In table 1 in the Appendix, it is shown that upstream pro￿ts are also
higher under price competition. It is due to the fact that under Bertrand competition the stronger
competition leads to a higher di⁄erentiation, allowing input suppliers to set higher prices, as the
reaction of the rival will be softened through this di⁄erentiation. The paradox is that upstream
7 To determine wL, equations [20] and [21] are introduced in [22]
12￿rms, by not internalizing all the e⁄ects derived from their input prices, favour a lower degree of
product di⁄erentiation and lower input prices.
By using equation [29] in input demands (equations [15] and [16]), the result obtained under
Cournot competition is replicated. In this setting wH > wL, and the low quality ￿rm also



















The relation between output and pro￿ts is as follows:
￿H = q2






As in the Cournot case, the best position of the low quality ￿rm in terms of output, is also obtained































For ￿ = 0 the chosen qualities are ￿H = 0:819521￿ and ￿L = 0:398722￿. For ￿ = 1 it is not
possible to ￿nd the equilibrium qualities as a function of ￿. In table 1 in the Appendix it is shown
that for ￿ = 5 and ￿ = 1 di⁄erentiation emerges. Furthermore, it can be proved that, for any value
of ￿ and ￿ = 1, if there exists equilibrium, downstream ￿rms always di⁄erentiate their products.
Proposition 2 Under Bertrand competition and variable costs of quality improvement, the
degree of product di⁄erentiation that downstream ￿rms choose reduces as the upstream bar-
gaining power increases. Downstream ￿rms always choose to di⁄erentiate their products,
whatever the distribution of the bargaining power.
Proof Appendix
Due to the fact that downstream ￿rms anticipate the ￿ercer competition in a Bertrand fashion,
the degree of product di⁄erentiation increases. In fact, we have seen in equation [18] how input
demands are more elastic under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. For ￿ = 0, the
di⁄erence between qualities is 0:420799￿, while under Cournot represents 0:15252￿. When ￿ = 1,
13the equilibrium in qualities cannot be obtained as a function of ￿ (however, it can be computed
by assigning values to ￿), but it can be proved that, for any value of ￿, downstream ￿rms do not
choose the same qualities.
3.3 A comparison between Cournot and Bertrand
In the Appendix, I include a table in which some numerical examples are performed. I do it for
the Bertrand and Cournot settings. For a better comparison with Motta￿ s article (1993), a value
of ￿ = 5 is ￿xed, the same value he uses. When ￿ = 0 (no upstream bargaining power), the
results coincide in both papers.
In table 1 in the Appendix, it can be checked how a higher upstream bargaining power leads to a
lower degree of product di⁄erentiation, the main result of this paper. This holds for both Bertrand
and Cournot competition, although in the former, for all the values of ￿, di⁄erentiation is always
greater. Downstream ￿rms anticipate the tougher competition in the ￿nal market, and they try
to soften such competition through higher di⁄erentiation, which prevails even though they have
no bargaining power at all (￿ = 1). As we expect, if ￿ increases, input prices go up, increasing up-
stream pro￿ts to the detriment of downstream ones. Nevertheless, the producer surplus increases
with ￿, although due to the double marginalization, this increase does not compensate the reduc-
tion in consumer surplus, which falls due to the reduction in ￿nal output and the increase in ￿nal
prices. Therefore, social welfare is decreasing in ￿. Under Bertrand competition, the ￿nal price
of the high quality good is higher than in the Cournot setting, but the opposite happens for the
low quality good, whose price is much lower under Bertrand competition. The reason is the lower
level of product di⁄erentiation that arises under Cournot competition, leading to similar prices
between both goods. In both settings, as ￿ increases, the uncovered market becomes greater, as
the quality and the price of the low quality good increases. However, the number of consumers
who do not buy any good is inferior in the Bertrand setting, due to the higher di⁄erentiation.
My results only contradict Motta￿ s (1993) when downstream ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot and they
14do not have any bargaining power. For the rest of analyzed cases, I obtain that ￿rms di⁄erentiate
their products in order to soften ￿nal market competition. As in Motta (1993), the standard result
that Cournot equilibrium pro￿ts exceed those under Bertrand competition holds. I also coincide
with Motta (1993) in the result about social welfare, which is always superior when ￿rms compete
￿ la Bertrand. The main contribution of this article is to show that upstream market power always
reduces the degree of product di⁄erentiation, given that input suppliers give downstream ￿rms
an incentive to compete through input prices, which turn out to be a positive externality for the
rival. As the input price of the high quality ￿rm is always higher, the low quality ￿rm bene￿ts
from a higher externality, being able to reduce the gap of qualities. When competition is not
too tough, in the Cournot case, the behaviour of input suppliers can lead downstream ￿rms to
a situation of no di⁄erentiation. The paradox is that upstream ￿rms would be better o⁄ with
a higher level of product di⁄erentiation, but setting prices independently they a⁄ect the way in
which downstream ￿rms choose qualities. In the next section, we will see how an upstream merger
allows the monopolist to internalize all the e⁄ects derived from input prices. Under coordination,
input prices are going to increase, not a⁄ecting the quality choice, and decreasing social welfare.
4 An Upstream Merger
In this setting, input suppliers can coordinate their actions as they are now horizontally integrated.
The last stage of the game does not change, remaining the downstream ￿rms pro￿ts expressions
equal, but the second stage does. Now, the monopolist, LHL, bargains simultaneously and sep-
arately with the two independent downstream ￿rms. This assumption is standard in situations
with multilateral contracting (Cremer and Riordan (1987), Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Milliou
and Petrakis (2007)). Under this assumption, the bargaining pair LHL and H has an incentive to
behave opportunistically during their negotiations, i.e., an incentive to secretly reach a mutually
favorable agreement that allows to enhance the competitive position of downstream ￿rm H to the
15detriment of its rival L. The rival pair LHL and L anticipate this opportunistic behavior. Fol-
lowing Cremer and Riordan (1987), Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Milliou and Petrakis (2007) a
contract between LHL and H is immune to a bilateral deviation of the pair LHL and L, holding
the contract with H constant. As in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Caprice (2006) and Milliou and
Petrakis (2007), it is also assumed that LHL and H cannot implement a contract specifying dif-
ferent contract terms in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations between LHL and L. The
supplier objective function is now:
￿HL = wH[lH(wH;wL)] + wL[lL(wH;wL)] (47)
On the other hand, although downstream ￿rms still have no disagreement payo⁄s, input supplier￿ s
are not zero anymore, given that now it has an outside option. If the negotiations between
the monopolist and downstream ￿rm H [L] fail, the disagreement payo⁄ of the former will be
￿HL
D (wL)[￿HL
D (wH)] when downstream ￿rm L [H] acts as a monopoly.
The monopolist bargains with downstream ￿rm H about the wholesale price wH. The outcome of
the simultaneous run negotiations with downstream ￿rm L are taken as given, and I denote such





where ￿HL(wH;wL) and ￿H(wH;wL) are upstream and downstream pro￿ts, respectively. ￿HL
D (wL) =
wLlL(wL) with lL(wL) = ￿￿L￿wL
2￿L is the disagreement payo⁄of the monopolist if downstream ￿rm
L also acts as a monopolist.8
4.1 Cournot competition











D (wH) = wHlH(wH) with lH(wH) =
￿￿H￿wH
2￿H is the disagreement payo⁄ of the upstream ￿rm, if down-
stream ￿rm H acts as a monopolist.
9 The negotiations between the upstream monopolist and downstream ￿rm L are simultaneous to those with

















][wLlL(wH;wL)] + wHlH(wH;wL)] ￿ wHlH(wH)] (50)
We can observe that upstream ￿rms internalize now the positive e⁄ect that their prices has on
rivals, wi
@li
@wj. As a result, they set higher prices, which are not going to depend on the quality
of the rival anymore. Before the upstream merger, if an input supplier increases the price of the
input, its input demand and pro￿ts will fall, increasing the input demand and the pro￿ts of its
rival. However, under upstream coordination, if the monopolist sets a higher price of the input i,
it recoups the losses of the fall in the demand through the greater demand of input j.10 On the











Proposition 3 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, input
prices are always higher with an upstream monopolist than in the case of independent input
suppliers, wUM
i > wi i=H;L.
Proof Appendix
This result can be found in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) in a setting of horizontal di⁄erentiation.
It can be explained through two e⁄ects. The ￿rst one is the positive e⁄ect that an increase in
the price of the input has on rival￿ s demand, just explained before. The second e⁄ect has to do
with the disagreement payo⁄s. If the upstream monopolist does not reach an agreement with a
downstream ￿rm, it recoups some losses through the increase of output that the other ￿rm obtains
acting as a monopolist in the ￿nal market. In other words, the fact of having an outside option
enhances the bargaining position of the upstream monopolist.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that input prices only depend on their own quality. If I
10 When necessary, I use in some variables the superscript UM (upstream merger), to distinguish from the case
of independent input suppliers.


















where ￿ = 2
2￿￿ and 1
￿ = 1 if ￿ = 0. Under upstream coordination, input suppliers take into account
all the e⁄ects derived from prices. The previous expressions show that input prices a⁄ect both
input demands equal, reducing them in the same fraction, 1
￿, and not a⁄ecting the market share




L . On the
other hand, as equation [34] still holds, the e⁄ect of input prices, 1
￿, does not a⁄ect the proportion






, and consequently the quality choice.




H ￿ 2￿￿L + ￿2
L)2￿H(￿ ￿ 2)2
16(￿4￿H + ￿L)2 (55)
￿UM
L =
(2￿ + ￿H ￿ 2￿L)2￿2
H￿L(￿ ￿ 2)2
16(￿4￿H + ￿L)2 (56)
where ￿ appears as a multiplicative constant, not a⁄ecting qualities and consequently the decision
of downstream ￿rms about them.
Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, the
presence of an upstream monopolist supplying inputs to both downstream ￿rms does not a⁄ect
the quality choice, whatever the distribution of the bargaining power in the vertical industry.
The equilibrium qualities coincides with those under no upstream market power at all.
4.2 Pro￿tability of the upstream merger
In this section I analyze whether an upstream merger in this context is pro￿table. As far as the
merger leads to a monopoly, and there is no outsiders ruining its pro￿tability, we expect that
upstream ￿rms are willing to merge. The merger will be successful whenever:
￿HL > ￿H + ￿L (57)
i.e., the joint pro￿ts are greater than independent ones; where ￿HL are the upstream monopolist
18pro￿ts when downstream ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot, and ￿H and ￿L are the pro￿ts of input
suppliers LH and LL, respectively, when they set prices independently and competition is ￿ la




H + ￿￿H￿L ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 2)￿2
L + 2￿(8￿H + (￿ ￿ 4)￿L))2
2(4￿H ￿ ￿L)(￿16￿H + ￿2￿L)2 (58)
￿L = ￿
(￿ ￿ 2)￿￿H￿L(4(2 + ￿)￿￿H ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 2)￿2
H ￿ 2￿￿￿L ￿ 8￿H￿L + ￿￿2
L)2
2(4￿H ￿ ￿L)(￿16￿H + ￿2￿L)2 (59)
￿HL = ￿





The inequality of equation [57] always holds,11 and it can be summarized in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 5 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, an
upstream merger is always pro￿table, whatever the distribution of the bargaining power in
the vertical industry.
Proof Appendix
In proposition 3, it was shown how the coordination between upstream ￿rms implies higher input
prices, as they internalize the e⁄ects that their prices provoke in rivals and their bargaining power
enhance through the availability of an outside option. This coordination leads to the pro￿tability
of the merger, for any value of ￿ and qualities.
4.3 Some numerical examples
The main result reported in table 1 in the Appendix is the fact that, under upstream coordination,
the quality choice by downstream ￿rms is not a⁄ected by parameter ￿. The values coincide
with the situation of no upstream ￿rms in the market (Motta (1993])). Nevertheless, as the
monopolist enhances its bargaining power, the price of the inputs increases. It can be checked,
according to proposition 3, that input prices are always greater under upstream coordination.
As a consequence, upstream pro￿ts become also greater, to the detriment of downstream ￿rms,
which face higher costs, reducing quantities and increasing ￿nal prices. This pushes consumer
11 Given that equilibrium qualities when upstream ￿rms act coordinately are always ￿H = 0:738096￿ and
￿L = 0:585576￿, I substitute these values in equation [60] to make the comparison easier.
19surplus down. The comparison of producer surplus is ambiguous, although social welfare is clearly
smaller. The increase in input prices and the double marginalization lead to the fall on welfare.
Finally, regardless of the fact that the quality choice does not change with ￿, the value of the
indi⁄erent consumers increases with the upstream bargaining power. The increase in ￿nal prices
makes bigger the uncovered market. As a conclusion, despite of the fact that an upstream merger
does not a⁄ect qualities, it results clearly anti-competitive: consumer surplus and social welfare
diminish, while the number of consumers who do not buy any good increases.
5 A Downstream Merger
Now I analyze how horizontal integration in the downstream industry a⁄ects the quality choice.
Downstream ￿rms become a monopolist, whereas input suppliers act independently. The down-
stream ￿rms joint pro￿ts expression is:
￿HL = (pHqH + pLqL) ￿ (lHwH + lLwL) (61)
5.1 Cournot competition









￿￿L ￿ 2qH￿L ￿ wL ￿ cL
2￿L
(63)
Both "reaction functions" have changed after the downstream merger, but the magnitude of the
change di⁄ers. Comparing equations [62] and [63] with the reaction functions before merging





￿H , whereas the change of the low quality one has been greater, from 1
2 to 1.
The merger increases the product interdependence, but the high quality production is less a⁄ected
by the low quality one. The new entity is going to contract output, but it ￿nds more pro￿table
12 When it is necessary, I use in some variables the superscript DM (downstream merger), to distinguish from
the rest of cases.
20to reduce the low quality production in a stronger way. From [62] and [63], input demands are
derived:
lDM
H (wH;wL) = qDM
H (wH;wL) =




L (wH;wL) = qDM
L (wH;wL) =
wH￿L ￿ wL￿H ￿ cL￿H + cH￿L
2(￿H ￿ ￿L)￿L
(65)
If we pay attention to the low quality input demand, it does not depend on ￿ anymore. Further-
more, it is easy to see that assuming ￿xed costs of quality improvement instead of variable costs,
and no upstream ￿rms (￿ = 0), the input demand of the low quality ￿rm would be zero, given that
the production of the low quality good only depends on production costs. Therefore, the merger
leads to a reduction of both goods, more important for the low quality one, whose pro￿tability
falls in favour of the high quality good. Another interesting e⁄ect derived from the merger is the



































The downstream merger has increased the responsiveness of the input demands to their prices.
The intuition is as follows. Through the merger, the downstream ￿rms have the possibility of
threatening input suppliers by replacing sales between goods. The lower the degree of product
di⁄erentiation, the easier the replacing and the greater the response of the input demands to their





forcing input suppliers to set prices at the competitive level. Thus, the downstream monopolist
can obtain lower input prices by producing closer qualities.Finally, the equilibrium downstream












As upstream ￿rms act independently, their pro￿ts are given by equation [21]. Each input supplier
bargains simultaneous and independently with the downstream monopolist, which enjoys now of
an outside option. If the negotiations between the monopolist and the input supplier LH [LL]
fails, the disagreement payo⁄ of the monopolist will be ￿D
L(wL) [￿D
H(wH)] when it only sells the
low (high) quality good.
The input supplier LH bargains with the downstream monopolist about the wholesale price wH.
The outcome of the simultaneous run negotiations with upstream ￿rm LL is taken as given, and I





where ￿HL(wH;wL) and ￿H(wH;wL) are downstream and upstream pro￿ts, respectively. ￿D
L(wL) =
pLqL ￿ lL(wL)wL with lL(wL) = ￿￿L￿wL
2￿L is the disagreement payo⁄ of the monopolist if it does
not reach an agreement with upstream ￿rm LH.13


























1￿￿ ￿ li(wi;wj)( @li
@wi)￿1
i;j=H;L i6=j (72)
On the one hand, when goods are not di⁄erentiated at all, the pro￿ts of the downstream monopolist
and its outside option coincide, making zero the ￿rst term of the equation. On the other hand,
as ( @li
@wi)￿1 also takes the value zero when ￿H = ￿L, input suppliers set wi = 0 when goods are
homogeneous. In this case the downstream monopolist can replace production between goods
13 ￿D
H(wH) = pHqH ￿ lH(wH)wH with lH(wH) =
￿￿H￿wH
2￿H is the disagreement payo⁄ of the monopolist if
negotiations with upstream ￿rm LL fail.
22perfectly, threatening input suppliers by shifting the demand of inputs to the rival, and forcing
them to decrease prices to the competitive level. The equilibrium input prices are:14
wDM
H =









This ability of the downstream monopolist to threaten input suppliers by shifting production leads
to the following result:
Proposition 6 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, a
downstream merger always leads to a fall in input prices, wDM
i < wi i=H;L.
Proof Appendix
This result is not new. It can be found in Horn and Wollinsky (1988), Dobson and Waterson
(1997), Lommerud et al (2003) and Symeonidis (2008, 2010). They work with settings of horizontal
di⁄erentiation, where the degree of product di⁄erentiation is exogenous. Inderst and Sha⁄er (2007)
construct a model where a downstream merger forces suppliers to compete to become the exclusive
supplier in two di⁄erent markets. Thus, the downstream monopolist decides to drop production of
one of the goods and reduce variety. Reductions in prices are based on a single-sourcing policy. The
degree of product di⁄erentiation is also reduced by suppliers to suit the characteristics of their
product to consumers preferences in both markets. In my setting the downstream monopolist
obtains a reduction in input prices by increasing the demand of one of the inputs to the detriment
of the other. By choosing similar qualities the shifting between input demands becomes easier,
forcing suppliers to compete ￿ercer. Therefore, the greater the upstream bargaining power (higher
input prices), the greater the incentives of the merging ￿rm to choose closer qualities. Proposition 7











































14 If we introduce the restriction ￿H = ￿L in the expressions of input prices we obtain wH = wL = 0
23The downstream monopolist chooses qualities in order to maximize ￿HL. Deriving the FOCs, for
￿ = 0 the chosen qualities are ￿H = 4
5￿ and ￿L = 1
2￿H. For ￿ ￿ 2
5 ￿H = ￿L = 2
3￿.
Proposition 7 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, the
degree of product di⁄erentiation that a downstream monopolist choose reduces as the upstream
bargaining power increases. No di⁄erentiation emerges whenever ￿ ￿ 2
5.
Proof Appendix.
The downstream merger increases the product interdependence, and we have seen how the new
entity prefers to reduce the low quality good more than the high quality one. For the merging ￿rm
is more pro￿table to reduce the quantity of the low quality good, and this leads to a reduction in
the quality of such good, whereas the level of the high quality one will be enhanced. Thus, for
low values of ￿, the degree of product di⁄erentiation increases with the downstream merger. In
fact, for ￿ = 0, the degree of product di⁄erentiation is the greatest of all the analyzed cases under
Cournot competition (see Table 1 in the Appendix). However, as ￿ increases, input prices also
increase, and the downstream monopolist has a new incentive to close the quality of its products:
to reduce such input prices by producing similar qualities, given that the lower the di⁄erentiation
the more elastic the input demands. So, after the merger, the downstream monopolist faces a
trade o⁄: reducing the ￿nal output to increase ￿nal prices (it leads to a higher di⁄erentiation
as the low quality production is reduced strongly), or choosing closer qualities to obtain lower
input prices. In the case of independent upstream and downstream ￿rms, we have seen how
di⁄erentiation decreases with ￿, although an scenario of no-di⁄erentiation only emerges for ￿ = 1.
But after the downstream merger, there exists an extra incentive to choose closer qualities, to
curb the market power of input suppliers, and no-di⁄erentiation will emerge for lower values of ￿,
precisely for ￿ ￿ 2
5.
5.3 Pro￿tability of the downstream merger
The downstream merger will be successful whenever the joint pro￿ts are greater than individually:
￿HL > ￿H + ￿L (76)
24By using equations [35], [36] and [75], the inequality of equation [76] always holds, and it can be
summarized in the following proposition,
Proposition 8 Under Cournot competition and variable costs of quality improvement, a
downstream merger is always pro￿table, whatever the distribution of the bargaining power in
the vertical industry.
Proof Appendix
In proposition 6, it was shown how the existence of a downstream monopolist implies lower input
prices, as input demands become more elastic. This coordination leads to the pro￿tability of the
merger, for any value of ￿.
5.4 Some numerical examples
An important result reported in table 1 in the Appendix is that the downstream monopolist
does not di⁄erentiate its products for ￿ ￿ 2
5, as input prices fall to their marginal costs for that
value. The chosen qualities for ￿ ￿ 2
5 coincides with those chosen for ￿ = 1 when all ￿rms act
independently and downstream ￿rms compete in quantities. For ￿ = 0, the degree of product
di⁄erentiation is the maximum of all the analyzed cases in a Cournot fashion. Therefore, the
respective ￿nal prices are also the maximum and minimum obtained. Final output falls due
to the downstream merger, being the reduction of the low quality good more important. We
saw how the merging ￿rm prefers to reduce the production of such good. The pro￿tability of
the downstream merger holds for all the analyzed values of ￿, and the pro￿ts of the monopolist
reduce with the upstream bargaining power. The level of the indi⁄erent consumers increases, and
regardless of the increase of producer surplus, social welfare decreases by the reduction of consumer
surplus. Another interesting result is that for values of ￿ > 4
5, social welfare increases with the
merger. When input suppliers enjoy high levels of market power, input prices are also high,
and a downstream merger pushes them down to their marginal cost. This important reduction is
transmitted to consumers through lower ￿nal prices and higher levels of production, countervailing
the negative e⁄ects of a downstream monopoly. Therefore, in those markets where there exists
25an important upstream market power, a downstream monopoly would improve the situation of
consumers and producers by curbing the market power of the input suppliers.
6 Conclusions
Several articles in the literature have studied quality choice under di⁄erent hypotheses at the mar-
ket stage. In this paper, I have introduced an upstream segment to analyze how the distribution
of the bargaining power between upstream and downstream ￿rms a⁄ects the degree of product
di⁄erentiation chosen by the latter. To this purpose, I have used the article of Motta (1993) as
a benchmark, where downstream ￿rms choose qualities in absence of upstream ￿rms. The main
￿nding of this paper is to show that the presence of upstream ￿rms a⁄ects the way in which
downstream ￿rms di⁄erentiate their products. Particularly, the higher the upstream bargaining
power, the lower the degree of product di⁄erentiation. Input suppliers and downstream ￿rms are
tied in a bilateral monopoly, and given that the former do not internalize all the e⁄ects derived
from their input prices, these input prices are going to depend on both qualities, a⁄ecting the ￿nal
decision about di⁄erentiation. My results only contradict Motta￿ s (1993) when competition is ￿
la Cournot and upstream ￿rms have all the bargaining power, given that in this case no di⁄eren-
tiation emerges. For the rest of analyzed cases, ￿rms always choose to di⁄erentiate their goods,
being higher the degree of product di⁄erentiation when ￿rms compete in prices, anticipating the
￿ercer competition in the ￿nal market. As in Motta (1993), social welfare is also maximized in
the Bertrand setting, and it is always lower with upstream presence. As upstream ￿rms enhance
their bargaining position, input prices increase, to the detriment of downstream ￿rms, consumers
and social welfare. The uncovered market becomes bigger as the bargaining power of input sup-
pliers improves. This is due to the fact that downstream ￿rms choose closer qualities and ￿nal
prices go up. The e⁄ects of an upstream merger have been also analyzed. In this case, as input
suppliers coordinate their actions, they are going to internalize all the e⁄ects that input prices
26have on rivals. Thus, input prices are not going to depend on the quality of the rival anymore, not
a⁄ecting the degree of product di⁄erentiation. Upstream coordination implies higher input prices
and lower social welfare. Furthermore, even though input prices do not a⁄ect di⁄erentiation, the
size of the uncovered market increases through higher ￿nal prices. Then, no positive e⁄ects seem
to derive from an upstream merger.
Another interesting result emerges when downstream ￿rms become a monopoly: no di⁄erentiation
is chosen unless input suppliers have su¢ ciently low bargaining power. A downstream monopolist
has the possibility of increasing the production of one good at the expense of the other, forcing
input suppliers to set lower prices. Of course, this replacing between goods is easier when goods
are not di⁄erentiated, and that is what the monopolist is going to choose: no di⁄erentiation.
This pushes input prices to marginal cost, and whenever input prices areo high enough before
the merger, such reduction is transmitted to consumers through lower ￿nal prices and a higher
production. Therefore, it is shown that a downstream monopolist can enhance social welfare.
The analysis in this model extends to Bertrand and Cournot competition, assuming variable costs
of quality improvement. On the other hand, negotiations between input suppliers and downstream
￿rms has been modelled as a generalized Nash bargaining problem. As far as upstream ￿rms
presence a⁄ects the quality choice due to a coordination problem, I do not think that assuming
￿xed costs of quality improvement changes the main result of this article. However, the way in
which negotiations take place could modify the ￿nding that an upstream monopolist does not




EQUILIBRIUM VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES FOR θ=5
Independet Firms Upstream Monopolist Downstream Monopolist
       Bertrand Competition Cournot Competition
γ=0 γ=1/2 γ=1 γ=0 γ=1/2 γ=1 γ=1/2 γ=1 γ=0 γ>2/5
νH 4,0976 4,0948 4,0231 3,6905 3,5841 3,3333 3,6905 3,6905 4 3,3333
νL 1,9936 2,1142 2,3381 2,9279 3,0607 3,3333 2,9279 2,9279 2 3,3333
νH-νL 2,104 1,9806 1,685 0,7626 0,5234 0 0,7626 0,7626 2 0
PH 11,3328 12,5256 13,5299 10,8427 11,5067 11,7284 12,7451 14,6475 14 11,1111
PL 3,7505 4,9463 6,6999 7,8631 9,377 11,7284 9,5571 11,2512 6 11,1111
lH=qH 1,3962 1,1731 0,9464 1,0928 0,9305 0,7407 0,8196 0,5464 1 0,8333
lL=qL 1,7225 1,4873 1,188 1,2216 1,0058 0,7407 0,9162 0,6108 1 0,8333
πH 4,1016 2,7258 1,5094 4,4071 3,1034 1,829 2,479 1,1018 10 9,2593
πL 3,0373 2,2621 1,3821 4,3696 3,0966 1,829 2,4579 1,0924
π
H
0 2,1333 3,6399 0 1,6273 2,7435 4,757 6,3427 0 0
π
L
0 1,7705 3,3302 0 1,6237 2,7435 0 0
wH 0 1,8185 3,8427 0 1,7487 3,7037 2,9106 5,8213 0 0
wL 0 1,1904 2,8032 0 1,6143 3,7037 2,5883 5,1766 0 0
θLØ 1,8813 2,3395 2,8655 2,6856 3,0636 3,5185 3,2642 3,8428 3 3,3333
θHL 3,6038 3,8269 4,0535 3,9072 4,0695 - 4,1804 4,4536 4 -
CS 11,7463 8,8452 6,0808 8,297 5,9648 3,658 4,6671 2,0743 5 4,6296
PS 7,1389 8,8918 9,8586 8,7766 9,451 9,145 9,6938 8,5368 10 9,2593
SW 18,8852 17,737 15,9394 17,0736 15,4158 12,803 14,3609 10,6111 15 13,8889
15 CS, PS and SW represent Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus and Social Welfare respectively. Following
Motta (1993), the consumer surplus has been computed:
R ￿HL
￿L? (￿￿L ￿ pL)d￿ +
R ￿
￿HL(￿￿H ￿ pH)d￿
For ￿ = 0, the case of independent ￿rms competing ￿ la Cournot coincides with the case of an upstream
monopolist
For simplicity, I assign the pro￿ts of the monopolist to the high quality ￿rm.
28Proof of Proposition 1
The chosen qualities, under Cournot competition, for ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 have been performed
by using the software Mathematica16 . Second order conditions are locally met. Leapfrogging is
never a pro￿table option. In this setting, (￿L;￿H;￿) = (0:585576￿; 0:738096￿; 0) and (￿L;￿H;￿) =
(2
3￿; 2
3￿;1) constitute an equilibrium. Given that ￿L ￿ ￿H, this relation can be stated as ￿Lk = ￿H






by using ￿Lk = ￿H, and obtaining k as a function of ￿, k = f(￿). Finally it can be proved that
@k(￿)
@￿ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof is the same that the one used for proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
The analysis carried out by the software Mathematica (Wolfram) con￿rms that wUM
i > wi i=H;L
for ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ ￿ 0 and 0 ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿H. A Mathematica ￿le with this result is available upon
request.
Proof of Proposition 5
Given that under upstream coordination, the chosen qualities are always ￿L = 0:585576￿;￿H =
0:738096￿, ￿HL has been performed with those qualities. When upstream ￿rms are independent
(￿L;￿H;￿) = (0:585576￿; 0:738096￿; 0) and (￿L;￿H;￿) = (2
3￿; 2
3￿;1) constitute an equilibrium.
I use the relation ￿Lk = ￿H with k ￿ 1. According to Proposition 1, k reduces with ￿. Thus,
k 2 [1;1:26]. I check the pro￿tability of the merger for ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ ￿ 0 and k 2 [1;1:26]. The
analysis carried out by the software Mathematica (Wolfram) con￿rms that ￿HL > ￿H + ￿L for
those values. A Mathematica ￿le with this result is available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 6
The analysis carried out by the software Mathematica (Wolfram) con￿rms that wDM
i < wi i=H;L
for ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ ￿ 0 and 0 ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿H. A Mathematica ￿le with this result is available upon
request.
Proof of Proposition 7 The proof is the same that the one used for proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 8
When downstream ￿rms are independent (￿L;￿H;￿) = (0:585576￿; 0:738096￿; 0) and (￿L;￿H;￿) =
(2
3￿; 2
3￿;1) constitute an equilibrium. When downstream ￿rms merge (￿L;￿H;￿) = (2
5￿; 4
5￿; 0)
and (￿L;￿H;￿) = (2
3￿; 2
3￿;1) constitute an equilibrium. I use the relation ￿Lk = ￿H with k ￿ 1.
According to Proposition 7, k reduces with ￿. Thus, k 2 [1;2]. I check the pro￿tability of the
merger for ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ ￿ 0 and k 2 [1;2]. The analysis carried out by the software Mathematica
(Wolfram) con￿rms that ￿HL > ￿H + ￿L for those values. A Mathematica ￿le with this result is
available upon request.
16 A Mathematica ￿le is available upon request.
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